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DISSOLUTION, DIVORCEMENT, DIVESTITURE: THE
PYRRHIC VICTORIES OF ANTITRUST*
W~\ALTER ADAMSt

"The hard core of the monopoly problem is the concentration of
economic power, specifically, the ownership and control of a large proportion of the industrial economy by a small number of giant corporations. Within the framework of the antitrust laws, the problem can be
met in only one way, namely through dissolution-trust-busting in the
literal sense."' Dissolution can be achieved under present law through
vigorous enforcement of Section 2 of the Sherman Act 2 which makes
it unlawful to "monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the
trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations."3
Section 4 of the Act authorizes proceedings 4in equity to eliminate unlawful monopolies and to restore competition.
* In the preparation of this article, the author has received. valuable suggestions,
criticisms and comments from Professor S. C. Oppenheim of the George Washington
University Law School.
' B.A., Brooklyn College; M.A., Yale University; Ph.D., Yale University; Economic
Consultant to House Small Business Committee (1950), and Senate Small Business
Committee (1951); Editor and co-author of THE STRUCTURE OF AMRICAN INDUSTRY
(MacMillan 1950); Associate Professor of Economics, Michigan State College.
1. Address by Dr. John M. Blair before the Economic Workshop at-the University
of Minnesota, July 12, 1949. As used in the subsequent discussion, "divestiture refers
to situations where the defendants are required to divest themselves of property,
securities or other assets. Divorcement is . . . used to indicate the effect of a decree
where certain types of divestiture are ordered. It is especially applicable to cases
where the purpose of the proceeding is to secure relief against anti-trust abuses
flowing from [vertically] integrated ownership and control. The term 'dissolution' is
generally used to refer to any situation where the dissolving of an allegedly illegal
combination or association is involved, including the use of divestiture and divorcement as methods of achieving that end. While the foregoing definitions differentiate
three aspects of remedies, the terms are frequently used interchangeably without any
technical distinctions in meaning." OPPENHEIM, CASES ON FEDERAL ANTI-TRUST LAWS
885 (1948).
2. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1946).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1946).
4. While the Sherman Act contains no specific provisions for equitable relief to
the public on account of violations of the Act, Section 4 does invest the courts with
jurisdiction not only to restrain violations (by means of injunction), but also to
prevent violations (by means of injunction "or otherwise"). The courts thus have the
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Prior to World War I, no substantial progress was made in breaking
up great industrial combinations. The two outstanding dissolution cases
during the period-United States v. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey5
and United States v. American Tobacco Co. 6-- failed to produce momentous results and can hardly be cited as good examples of what a
dissolution policy can accomplish. The Standard Oil decree had the fatal
flaw of leaving economic control over the successor companies with the
same interests that had exercised control over the parent company prior
to dissolution. The American Tobacco decree was even weaker, for here:
The Court adopted the celebrated "three way" principle whereby
monopoly was conceived to be eliminated and competition
restored by the simple means of dividing a trust into three
roughly equal parts. The reason for selecting the magic figure
"3" and not 7, 11, 60 (as was proposed) 100, or any other
number was based, as might be expected, on legal rather than
economic considerations. The Court felt that the firms created
by'a "three-way" division would be too small to be subject to
prosecutions as "monopolies" under the Sherman Act. The
possibility that the firms might be so large that they could
readily follow uniform price policies and in other ways adopt
monopolistic practices-as they have recently been convicted of
doing 7-was given no weight by the Court.8
The period between the great wars was marked by two major
defeats for the Government. In the United States Steel case 9 of 1920, the
Supreme Court announced its famous ruling that "the law does not
make mere size an offense, or the existence of unexerted power an
power to dissolve an unlawful combination and can use that power whenever necessary
to give complete relief. United States v. Great Lakes Towing Co., 217 Fed. 656
(N.D. Ohio 1914). As Oppenheim points out, it is essential to recognize "that the
essence of equity jurisdiction is the power of the court to mould the decree to the
necessities of the particular case. Invocation by the United States of the general
authority of a court of equity under the Sherman Act enables the court to exercise
a wide discretion in framing its decree so as to give effective and adequate relief.
Since the public interest is directly involved, the court may go further in giving relief
than it does when only private rights are involved. The Sherman Act vests the court
with jurisdiction not only to 'restrain' but also to 'prevent' violations of the Act by
injunctions 'or otherwise.'" OPPENHEIM, op. cit. suprd note 1, at 885-6.

5. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
6. 221 U.S. 106 (1911).

7. See 328 U.S. 781 (1946).

8. BLAIR, op. cit. supra note 1. For a further discussion of the Tobacco case and
the dissolution decree of 1911, see JONES, THE TRusT PROBLEM IN THE UNITED STATES
123-63, 452-74 (1929) ; SEAGER AND GULICK, TRUST AND CORPORATION PROBLEMS 149-95
(1929); STEVENS, INDUSTRIAL COMBINATIONS AND TRUSTS 440-61, 472-516 (1913);
Cox, COMPETITION IN THE AMERICAN ToBACCO INDUSTRY (1932); Hale, Trust Dissolution: "Atomizing"' Business Units of Monopolistic Size, 40 COL. L. REV. 617-20,
628-31 (1940).
9. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920).
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offense."' 10 This doctrine was given added vitality by the International
Harvester decision': of 1927. Needless to say, these two opinions
constituted a virtual cease fire order on the dissolution front.'
10. Id. at 451.
11. United States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693 (1927): "[T]he law
* . . does not make the mere size of a corporation, however impressive,
or the existence of an unexerted power on its part, an offense, when unaccompanied by unlawful
conduct in the exercise of its power." Id. at 708.
12. In this connection it is interesting to observe that less than two months after
the Steel opinion, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Reading Co., 253 U.S.
26 ,(1920), and decreed that the defendant company be dissolved. The Court held
that the company's "dominating power was not obtained by normal expansion to meet
the demands of a business growing as a result of superior and enterprising management, but by deliberate, calculated purchase for control. That such a power, so
obtained, regardless of the use made of it, constitutes a menace to and an undue
restraint upon interstate commerce within the meaning of the Anti-Trust Act has
been frequently held by this court." Id. at 57. The Court concluded, therefore, that
"for flagrant violation of the first and second sections of the Anti-Trust Act, the
relations between the heading Company, the Reading Railway Company and the
Reading Coal Company and between these companies and the Central Railroad of
New Jersey must be s. dissolved as to give to each of them a position in all respects
independent and free from stock or other control of either of the other corporations."
Id. at 59, 60.
Of special significance in this opinion is the Court's assertion that the existence
of a combination and its inherent market power, regardless of the use made of it,
constitutes a violation of the law. By making monopoly power, rather than its exercise,
the crucial test of legality, the Court followed the ruling of Northern Securities v.
United States, 193 U.S. 197 1904) and United States v. Union Pacific R.R., 226
U.S. 61 (1912) (as well as the dissent in the Steel case), and seemingly rejected
the subsequent precedents of United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 247 U.S.
32 (1918) and United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920). Of
further significance is the fact that in the Reading case the Court deemed a 33
per cent control over the market as constituting monopoly, whereas in the Shoe
Machinery and Steel cases the same Court held that a 95 and 65 per cent control over
the market, respectively, did not come within the meaning of the statute. How, it may
be asked, can such widely divergent opinions be issued by the same court in a period
of three years?
The answer seems to, be that only seven Justices participated in the Shoe M1achinery
and Steel cases, while the full Court heard and decided the Reading case. Both the
Shoe Machinery and Steel cases were decided by a 4-3 vote-Justices White, McKenna,
Holmes, and Van Devanter voting with the majority; Justices Pitney, Clarke, and
Day with the minority; and Justices Brandeis and McReynolds abstaining. Had
Brandeis and McReynolds cast their votes (as they did in the Reading case), the Shoe
Machinery and Steel decisions would have gone down as 5-4 victories instead of 4-3
defeats for the Government.
One other question warrants explanation, viz. why the Reading case, since it was
decided by a full court, never became the controlling precedent in subsequent litigation. The answer seems to lie in the drastic changes which occurred in the composition
of the Court shortly after the Reading decision was announced. By 1922, four Justices
had retired: White, Pitney, Clarke, and Day. Of these, Pitney, Clarke, and Day had
voted with the minority in the Shoe Machinery and Steel cases, and with the majority
in the Reading case. Chief Justice White, on the other hand, had voted against the
Government in all three cases. Thus, of the retiring Justices, three could be classified
as "antitrust minded" while one was not. By contrast, all of their successors had
little if any sympathy for a vigorous anti-trust program: Taft (1921), Sutherland
(1922), Butler (1922), and Sanford who wrote the majority opinion in the Harvester
case (1923). By 1923, therefore, only Brandeis and McReynolds remained (to be joined
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Then, starting in the late 1930's, the nation became alarmed over
the high degree of concentration in the economy. Even greater concern
was expressed over the growing centralization of control that occurred
during World War II and the post-war merger movement. 1 3 As a result,
and in an effort to check this trend, the Department of Justice has in
recent years attempted to revitalize the long dormant Section 2 of the
Sherman Act by filing an increasing number of dissolution, divorcement
4
and divestiture cases..

The obvious purpose behind this recent emphasis on dissolution.
divorcement and divestiture is to reduce the degree of concentration in
highly concentrated industries ;15 to deprive monopolistic firms or groups
of firms of their power over price and their ability to exclude cormpetitors; in short, to promote competition by creating a larger number of
6
bona fide independent competitors in certain lines of commerce.'
by Stone in 1925) to raise their dissenting voice against judicial acquiescence in the
combination and merger movement of the Harding-Coolidge-Hoover era.
13. Smaller War Plants Corporation, Economic Concentration and World War II,
SEN. Doc. No. 206, Part 1, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946); UNITD STATES FEDERAL
TRAen COMM'N, REPORT ON THE PRESENT TREND OF CORPORATE MERGERS AND AcQUIsITIONS (1947); UNITED STATES FEDERAL TRADE CommN, THE CONCENTRATION OF PRODUCTIVE FACILITIES, 1947 (1949) ; NATIONAL RESOURCES COMM"ITTEE,
THE AMERICAN ECONOMY (1947).

THE

STRUCTURE OF

14. Among the more important dissolution, divorcement, and divestiture proceedings
in this group are those filed against Aluminum Company of America (1937), Paramount
Pictures, Inc. (1938), The Pullman Company (1940), General Electric (1941), National
Lead Company (1944), Libby-Owens-Ford (1945), American Can Company (1946), Continental Can Company (1946), A. B. Dick Company (1946), American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers (1947), United Shoe Machinery Corp. (1947), Armour
& Company (1948), Western Electric Company, Inc. (1949), E. I. du Pont de Nemours
& Company (1949), The New York Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company, Inc.' (1949),
Celanese Corporation of America (1949), Lee Shubert (1950), Standard Oil Company
of California (1950), and General Outdoor Advertising Corp. (1950).
15. Testifying before the Senate Subcommittee on Appropriations in 1946, Attorney
General Clark (now Mr. Justice Clark of the Supreme Court) stated the need for
restoring competition "by the seldom used processes of dissolution, divorcement, and
divestiture." Similarly, in his Annual Report of June 30, 1947, he said: "In regard
to monopolies, I have encouraged the application of the remedies of divestiture and
divorcement in civil suits .brought under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, as the most
expeditious means of eradicating this economic evil. The ramifications of monopoly
are myriad and, when allowed to develop unchecked, have an effect upon every aspect
of the economic scene. Nowhere is this effect more apparent than in the fields of
production and pricing and upon no one is the impact of monopolistic policies more
severe than upon the small businessman." REP. ATr'y. GEN. 8 (1947).
16. Needless to say, many of the recent Section 2 cases are not directed against
the cruder forms of monopoly (as typified by the pre-1911 Standard Oil and American
Tobacco companies). They are concerned, instead, with oligopoly-a type of market
structure where a few sellers (the "Big Three" and the "Big Four") are dominant.
Under this type of market organization, the entry of newcomers is effectively deterrednot so much by the threat of economic reprisals as by the size and entrenched power
of existing firms. Under oligopoly, 'moreover, a seller no longer can afford to be
independent in his choice of a price policy. He must, of necessity, take the reaction
of his rivals into account. He must anticipate that price cutting will inevitably cause
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Unfortunately, however, the Department's dissolution program has
not, on the whole, produced the desired results. In sharp contrast to
the many legal triumphs, economic relief has generally been unimpressive.
Remedial action approved by the. courts has, in most instances, failed
to lessen concentration and restore effective competition. 17 As the
following case studies indicate, firms found guilty of possessing and
exercising monopoly power have-with the notable exception of the
motion picture companies'S--escaped dissolution, divorcement, and divestiture.
his large competitors to follow suit with the result that the market is shared as it
was before--only at a lower level of prices and profits. It is this certainty that price
cuts will eventually be met, it is this fear of retaliation, that leads to conservative and
non-aggressive price policies in many of our oligopolistic industries.
The economic result of oligopoly pricing is substantially similar to that which
would obtain if but a single firm dominated a given field. The result is collusionnot in the common sense meaning of the word, to be sure-but parallel action, nevertheless, as far as the effects of market behavior are concerned. As Fritz Machlup
observed not long ago: "A covenant signed with blood, an agreement signed with
ink, an understanding without written words, concerted acts approved with a wink
or a nod, a common course of action followed without physical communication-these
may be different methods of collusion, but the differences are irrelevant if the effects
are the same." Machlup, What's Best for the Competitive Enterprise System.?, DzIvERED PRICING AND THE FUTURE OF AiERICAN BUSINESS 195 (1948).
17. In discussing the choice of a remedy in civil antitrust cases, Justice Jackson
stressed the importance of granting such economic relief as will effectively prevent
future violations and be adequate in restoring competition in the industry concerned:
"The District Court is not obliged to assume, contrary to common experience, that
a violator of the antitrust laws will relinquish the fruits of his violation more completely than the court requires him to do . . . . When the purpose to restrain trade
appears from a clear violation of law, it is not necessary that all of the untraveled
roads to that end be left open and that only the worn one be closed. The usual
ways to the prohibited goal may be blocked against the proven transgressor, . . . . In an
equity suit, the end to be served is not punishment of past transgression, nor is it
merely to end specific illegal practices. A public interest served by such civil suits
is that they effectively pry open to competition a market that has been closed by
defendant's illegal restraints. If this decree accomplishes less than that, -the Government has won a lawsuit and lost a cause." International Salt Co. v. United States,
332 U.S. 392, 400, 401 (1947).
18. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948). The motion
picture cases represent what is probably the Government's greatest economic victory
in the sixty year history of antitrust enforcement. For more than eleven years the
Department of Justice battled through three court decisions, a war, and two intervening
consent decrees in order finally to achieve the complete divorcement of the major
motion picture producers from their affiliated exhibition outlets. Moreover, the Government obtained, in addition to vertical divorcement, a considerable measure of horizontal dissolution on the exhibition level.
Throughout, the major question in the motion picture cases was not the guilt
or innocence of the defendants but rather the finding of a suitable remedy to prevent
future violations. And on this question,, the district court was adamant; it stated that,
while vertical integration is not a per se violation of the Sherman Act, vertical integration does become illegal if conceived with a specific intent to control the market
or if used to create a power to control the market. Furthermore, the court held that
vertical integration in this industry was a definite means by which unlawful competitive
niethods were effectuated. Hence, the court concluded that there had been collective
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United States v. Aluininum Co. of America 0 is a prize example to
demonstrate how ready the courts are to denounce iniquity while steadfastly refusing to correct it. It is a case in which the Government, after
a battle of thirteen years, won a resounding legal victory only to suffer
a crushing economic defeat.
The proceedings were initiated on April 23, 1937 with a complaint
against Alcoa, 25 of its subsidiary and affiliated companies, and 37
of its directors, officers and stockholders. The complaint charged Alcoa
-with monopolizing the manufacture of virgin aluminum and the sale of
aluminum sheets, alloys, cables, bars, etc., in the United States. It
alleged that this monopoly was preserved and protected by the purchase
of plants abroad and by cartel agreements with foreign producers. It
claimed that the monopoly was acquired by restrictive contracts and
oppressive tactics, including discriminatory prices and the squeezing of
price spreads between virgin ingot and aluminum sheet for the purpose
of eliminating new competitors. In order to obtain effective relief-in
order to re-establish competition in the aluminum industry-the Government requested Alcoa's dissolution.
After a lengthy trial, the district court on June 23, 1942 entered an
opinion holding the defendants not guilty and ordering the petition dismissed. 20 This decision was reversed, however, by the circuit court of
appeals 21 on March 12, 1945 in one of the most celebrated judicial
opinions of our time. Judge Learned Hand ruled that Alcoa was an
illegal monopoly at the time of trial; that the company had monopolized
the aluminum sheet market and squeezed independents out of the fabricating business; and that Alted (Alcoa's Canadian subsidiary) had
entered into agreements with European aluminum producers which
affected imports into the United States.
From a legal point of view the Hand decision was a milestone, for
it'finally interred and reversed the old dictum that mere size is no offense
under the Sherman Act. As one writer observed:
Size [to Judge Hand] was not only evidence of violation, or of
potential offense . . . it was the essence of the offense. Size,
use of monopoly power and that "divorcement . . . appears to be the only adequate
means of terminating the conspiracy and preventing any resurgence of monopoly power
on the part of the . . . defendants." 85 F.Supp. 881, 896 (S.D. N.Y. 1949).
19. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). The following discussion of the aluminum litigation is based on Adams, The Aluminum Case: Legal Victory-Economic Defeat, 41 Am.

EcoN. Rv. 915 (1951).
20. 44 F.Supp. 97 (S.D. N.Y. 1941).

21. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). The case was certified to the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit on June 12, 1944 (322 U.S. 716 (1944)) because the
Supreme Court was unable to obtain a quorum to sit on the appeal (320 U.S. 708

(1942)).
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meaning market control, was what competition and monopoly
were about. All other aspects of the case were subordinated to
the central and decisive fact that the Aluminum Company of
America, many years after its patents had expired, made, and
then fabricated, or sold, over 90 per cent of the virgin aluminum
used in the United States. Its arrangements with foreign
companies for dividing world markets were further evidence of
monopolizing. That it had engaged in deplorable tactics to prevent other companies from entering the field helped compound
the offense. But the case was proved, in Judge Hand's view,
by showing the company's market power. It made over 90 per
cent of the virgin aluminum, and therefore had monopoly
power. 22

In sharp contrast to the court's willingness to pronounce Alcoa a
monopoly, stands the court's refusal to alleviate the situation. On the
problem of relief the court merely recommended that remedial measures
be withheld until such time as the district court could evaluate the effects
of the Government's program for the disposal of surplus aluminum
plants. Only if this disposal program failed to create substantial competition in the industry was the trial court authorized to consider dissolution. In other words, the task of creating competition in the aluminum
industry was shunned by the court and "assigned" to the disposal agency'
of the Government.
Perhaps, on the face of it, this solution of the relief problem seems
plausible, especially since the objectives of the Surplus Property Act of
194423 coincided in many respects with those of the antitrust laws.
Under that Act preference was to be given to smaller purchasers to an
'24
extent consistent with "the usual and customary commercial practice."
Above all, no disposal agency was even to begin negotiations for selling
a plant valued in excess of $1,000,000 without first being advised by the
Attorney General whether the proposed disposition would violate the
antitrust laws. 25 Impressed with these provisions of the Surplus Property
Act, the court thought that the prospects for competition in aluminum
were bright and that the disposal of Government plants might make
the dissolution of Alcoa unnecessary.
22. RosTow, A NATIONAL
23. 58 STAT. 765 (1944),

127 (1948).
The express intention of

POLICY FOR TE OIL INDUsTY

50 U.S.C. § 1611 (1946).

Congress was, among others, to "give maximum aid in the re-establishment of a
peacetime economy of free independent enterprise . . ., discourage monopolistic practices and to strengthen and preserve the competitive position of small business concerns
in an economy of free enterprise; . . . foster the development of new independent
enterprise; . . . dispose of surplus property as promptly as feasible without fostering
monopoly or restraint of trade. . . ... Ibid.

24. 50 U.S.C. § 1627(b) (1946).
25. 50 U.S.C. § 1629 (1946).
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The court was mistaken-if not naive-however, to think that a disposal of surplus aluminum plants could stimulate competition sufficiently
to obviate the necessity of dissolving Alcoa. The court failed to recognize
that its refusal to deal with the specifics of relief confined the disposal
agency to a limited and narrow course of action. Faced with an Alcoa
of colossal dimensions, the disposal agency was forced to adopt a program
which would create new producers of substantial enough size and integration to compete effectively with the undiminished monopolist. The
disposal agency had no power to reorganize the facilities owned by
Alcoa. It could hardly dispose of the Government plants to a large
number of independent concerns incapable of coping with Alcoa's position of dominance and entrenchment. The agency chose the only feasible
alternative: it brought into being two new integrated producers and
created them in the image of Alcoa. It elected a course of action made
inevitable by the court's refusal to deal with the problem of Alcoa's size.
Had the circuit court seriously attacked the problem of relief, it
would have appreciated the importance of reorganizing Alcoa's structure;
it would have recognized that such reorganization was an essential
prerequisite to stimulating greater competition in the aluminum industry
and placing that industry on a broad base of independent competing
producers. As things turned out, the structure of the aluminum industry
was reshaped after 1945, but this was due almost entirely to the actions
of the War Assets Administration rather than to the relief granted by
the circuit court.
The 1945 decision was not the end of this case, however, for both
Alcoa and the Government were permitted to seek further relief. Accordingly, when the disposal program of the War Assets Administration
was completed, Alcoa petitioned the court (March 1947) to declare that
it no longer had a monopoly of the ingot market. In September 1948,
the Government also filed a petition alleging that competitive conditions
had not been re-established in the aluminum industry; that Alcoa had
continued to dominate and control the aluminum ingot market; and that,
only through divestiture by Alcoa of plants and other properties, could
competitive conditions be established. The Government's petition attempted to show that divestiture of Alcoa was practicable; that at least
one new domestic integrated producer could be established as part of
a program to create competitive conditions; and that following divestiture Alcoa would continue to be a fully integrated producer, under no
competitive disadvantage, and with such facilities, production, sales
volume, and ability to expand so as to permit and encourage it to grow
with the rest of the industry. The petition attempted to demonstrate that
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a fourth producer could be established without disintegrating Alcoa;
that the structure of Alcoa was not that of an inseparable entity, but of
duplicate facilities which fulfill the needs of market control rather than
26
integrated efficiency.
These issues were tried before Judge Knox in 1949, and the court's
opinion was handed down on June 2, 1950.27 The court, in denying

both petitions, found that competitive conditions had not been restored
in the aluminum industry and that the Government was entitled to further relief. The relief granted by the court included the finding that
certain provisi6ns in the patent licenses issued by Alcoa were unenforceable; and that persons who held stock in both Alcoa and Alted (the
Canadian subsidiary) be required to divest themselves of the stock in
either of the two corporations. Jurisdiction over the case was retained
for another five years during which time both parties, if conditions so
warrant, can petition the court for further and more complete relief.
The court's opinion is disturbing for a number of reasons.
First, the relief granted is inadequate and the prospects for further
relief are dim. Judge Knox seemed satisfied with the industry's present
structure and expressed little concern over the small number of firms
in the field. Disregarding almost entirely the implications of the threeproducer oligopoly, the court focused its primary attention on the ability
of Reynolds and Kaiser to survive and expand. It is likely, therefore,
that no reorganization of the aluminum industry by judicial action will
take place in the next five years; that at the end of this period-if
Reynolds and Kaiser hold their own-the court will pronounce competitive conditions in aluminum to have been re-established: the court will
then terminate its jurisdiction in the case.
26. The Government relief petition was exceedingly mild. It merely requested
a partial horizontal disintegration of Alcoa. What the Government should have
demanded as a minimum additional requirement was that Alcoa be enjoined from any
further vertical integration-especially in the fabrication field. Some such requirementlimited perhaps to a period of five years-was essential to deprive Alcoa of its power
to squeeze independents in the future as it had done in the past. Moreover, as a
House committee investigating the aluminum industry recently pointed out, "it is
not price competition of ingot that worries any of the 'Big Three', for that question
seems to have been resolved by a price leadership pattern that suits all of them.
While the courts may have their eye on the price of pig as an indication of monopoly
pricing, it is in reality a vertical organization of each of the 'Big Three' from ingot
production to finished products that is the hazard to the survival and growth of
new independent producers. It is the same integrated organizational structure which
prevents the widest possible use of aluminum for purposes which are not only possible
but which would prove a great boon to the public." H.R. REP. No. 255, 82d Cong., 1st
Sess. 24 (1951).
27. United States v. Aluminum Company of America, 91 F.Supp. 333 (S.D. N.Y.

1950).
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Needless to say, Kaiser and Reynolds will survive and the status
quo in the industry will be maintained during the next five years. This
outcome seems certain because Alcoa-in order to forestall any future
relief action by the court-will refrain from expanding its share of the
market. By exercising self-restraint, Alcoa will demonstrate that Kaiser
and Reynolds can maintain their market position, and possibly, improve
it. By judiciously avoiding any aggressive or expansive activity,
Alcoa can thus effectively bar the Government from showing the need
for further relief in the crucial five-year period. By pursuing a "live
and let live" policy, which has proved so effective in other industries,
Alcoa can then insure the termination of the court's jurisdiction by 1955.
Given the present high level of business activity, such a conservative
course of action need by no means be unprofitable.
The second cause for concern is the precedent which the Knox
opinion establishes with respect to future antitrust cases involving'oligopolistic industries. The Government brief dwelt at considerable length
on the fact that failure to grant divestiture relief in this case would be
tantamount to judicial approval of a three-producer industry. The court's
refusal to divest Alcoa and, thus, create at least one additional domestic
producer might, therefore, be construed as a judicial sanction for the
type of structural organization now prevailing in the aluminum industry.
Furthermore, the court's refusal to concede that in an industrial structure
of this sort, Alcoa, as the dominant firm, exercises control over its competitors seems ominous. The monopolistic significance of price leadership and the zone system of pricing enforced by Alcoa was ignored. The
court failed to appreciate the fear engendered among fabricators that
Alcoa, because of its dominant position, could ruin them by a simple
refusal to sell (or, as it is euphemistically called, maintaining the right
to "select its customers"). Thus, some of the more basic elements of the
"parallel action" theory, which is essential in proving an oligopoly case,
were disregarded. This opinion may, therefore, become a substantial
obstacle in the future prosecution of cases involving companies in highly
concentrated industries.
A third cause for concern is the court's effort to establish a foreign
producer as the fourth competitor in a highly concentrated domestic
industry. This objective was sought to be accomplished by separating the
control of the Canadian company from Alcoa. Realistically viewed, however, such action is unlikely to promote a more competitive market in
the United States for a number of reasons: first, despite the change
in stock control, the Canadian company will not become an active competitor, either in the domestic ingot or the fabricated aluminum market,
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since the largest consumers of ingot in the United States are the three
primary producers (Alcoa, Reynolds, and Kaiser) and since Alted does
not have the facilities for expanded participation in the American fabricated aluminum market. Furthermore, Alted is Canada's sole producer
and therefore enjoys an undisputed monopoly position in its own country.
In addition, Alted has long been the motivating force in the cartelization
of the world aluminum industry and will probably continue its efforts in
that direction in the future. Finally, if the Canadian company should
ever initiate an aggressively competitive policy in the United States
market, tariff barriers could always be raised sufficiently to "protect" our
vital domestic industry. Keeping these facts in mind, it is difficult to
conceive how a corporation so traditionally opposed to the competitive
philosophy as Alted, can take the place of a fourth producer in- the
28
American aluminum industry.
There is one final aspect of the court's opinion which is disturbing,
especially since it relates to national security. As has been noted above,
the opinion places great emphasis on the maintenance of the status quo
in the industry. This fact is bound to discourage, therefore, any expansion of Alcoa's productive facilities (such as the company had contemplated in Alaska, for example).29 At the same time, the potential threat
of Canadian competition may inhibit expansion by Reynolds and Kaiser,
at least until such time as the nature of that competition has been
determined. The Canadian company, by contrast, is free to expand without restraint and is currently doing so by adding substantially to its
facilities in British Columbia. 30
The result i s anomalous: Canadian facilities during the next five
years will tend to expand while our own aluminum capacity may remain
28. After an extensive investigation of the aluminum industry, a House committee appraised the competitive potential of the Canadian company in the United
States market as follows: "Thus far, there are only three primary aluminum producers
in the United States. Alcan [Alted] does not constitute the fourth competitor in
domestic markets as its pricing policy (despite its lower costs) is to follow Alcoa's
Competition would not be fostered if instead of increasing the number
price ....
of American producers [in the wartime expansion program], this Government aided
Alcan lives and operates in a world of trade
the further growth of Alcan ....
beyond the United States antitrust laws and often unfriendly to the United States
philosophy of competition. Alcan for years was the leader of the European aluminum
cartel. Although no longer a member, Alcan is subject to influences in world markets
that restrain trade. .Alcan and its various competitors in other countries jointly own
aluminum companies in a number of countries including Norway, Australia, and China.
Although the European cartel has formally ended after Alcoa's prosecution, Alcan's
behavior in world markets, including the United States, necessarily departs from United
States concepts of competition. Therefore, fufther expansion of Alcan in United States
markets can hardly be regarded as a healthy gain for competition." CommiTrEE REPoRT,
op. cit. supra note 26, at 32.
29. See 91 F.Supp. 333, 399, 400 (S.D. N.Y. 1950).
30. Com irx REroR, op. cit. supra note 26, at 29, 30.
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static. Thus, we may well become more dependent on a foreign producer
31
for an increasing part of our national aluminum requirements.
In summarizing the results of thirteen years of litigation in the
Alcoa case, one is impressed with the insignificance of the relief obtained
by the Government. A company which had monopolized the aluminum
industry for fifty years was permitted to remain intact. An economically
mild-probably excessively mild-proposal for divestiture was refused.
Once again, the court chose the easy solution. Judge Hand passed the
task of stimulating competition in this basic industry to the War Assets
Administration. Judge Knox attempted to introduce a new competitor
in the domestic market by severing the formal ties between Alcoa and
Alted. Both refused to undertake the kind of physical reorganization of
the industry necessary to bring about a competitive structure consistent
32
with the objectives of the Sherman Act.
As a result, aluminum today is a three-producer industry; Alcoa,
instead of being a single-firm monopoly, now exercises residual monopoly
power through price leadership and other means; the concerted action
typical of oligopoly has replaced the unilateral action characteristic of
monopoly. A ringing judicial denunciation of monopoly has produced
31. That this is not a desirable prospect was pointed out by the Monopoly Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee. As the Committee observed, "Canadian
aluminum is subject to any regulations placed by the Canadian Government and any
agreements entered into with the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth countries.
In other words, British Empire countries have a preferential position. In October
1950, Alcan had to reduce its offer to this country of 1951 and 1952-deliveries because
of increased obligations to the United Kingdom. In the 1939 and 1940 loan agreement
between Alcan and the United Kingdom, Alcan agreed to give the British Government
first call annually on 107,500 metric tons. In the 1950 agreement with the British
Government, Alcan gave another first call of 200,00 metric tons annually for a long
term. Perhaps the United States Government also could obtain a first call on any
additional capacity Alcan may build. However, that capacity will always be under
the jurisdiction of another country, no matter how friendly, and that is not the same
thing as being fully accessible to the United States at all times." Co.iuirrz REPoRT,
op. cit. supra note 26, at 32-33.
32. In all fairness -to Judge Knox, it is to be remembered that Learned Hand,
sitting on a higher court, had refused dissolution and ordered that only if the Government's surplus disposal program failed to create substantial competition in the industry was the trial court authorized to consider dissolution. Judge Knox might have felt
that this decision 'by Hand restricted his choice, since the appearance of Kaiser and
Reynolds arguably had created "substantial" competition. Moreover, Judge Knox was
probably aware of the possibility that a number of future developments could subvert
the effort to end the common control exercised by Alcoa and Alted, when he decided
to retain jurisdiction of the case for another five years. Declared Judge Knox:
"Together, Limited and Alcoa are in a position at any time, to restrain effectively the
growth of 'Reynolds and Kaiser. Accordingly inasmuch as irreparable harm can result
from a delay in remedies, it is unwise for this court to relinquish jurisdiction of this
action until it is assured that the aluminum industry has been oriented ih a lawful
direction." United States v. Aluminum Company of America, 91 F.Supp. 333, 418
(S.D, N.Y. 1950).
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little in the way of affirmative relief. Vigorous and effective competition
has not been re-established in this basic and vital industry.
Another illustration of some of the problems which confront the
Antitrust Division in obtaining adequate relief from the courts is the
case of United States v. National Lead Co. 33 The decision shows that

while the Division is extremely successful in establishing liability, i.e.,
proving a violation of the antitrust laws, it seems ineffective in securing
meaningful relief.
The case involved three corporations charged with the creation of
a world-wide cartel in titanium compounds and conspiracy with substantially all of the important chemical companies of the world. At the
conclusion of the trial, the court upheld the Government's charges. It
ruled that the defendants had violated the antitrust laws through participation in an international cartel, and that their agreements creating a
world-wide patent pool and dividing the world into exclusive territories,
for the purpose and with the effect of suppressing imports into and
exports from the United States, had violated the Sherman Act. In spite
of this finding, however, the district court refused to grant the Government's requests for royalty-free licensing and divestiture. The Supreme
Court, in upholding the decision, rejected the Government's plea that
each duopolist be required to divest one of its two principal titanium
pigments plants:
There is no showing that four major competing units would be
preferable to two, or, including Zirconium and Virginia Chemical, that six would be better than four. Likewise, there is no
showing of the necessity for this divestiture of plants or of its
practicality and fairness. The findings of fact have shown
vigorous and effective competition between National Lead and
du Pont in this field .

. .

. Such competition suggests that

the District Court would do well to remove unlawful handicaps
from it but demonstrates no sufficient basis for weakening its
force by divesting each of the two largest competitors of one
of its principal plants. It is not for the courts to realign and
redirect effective and lawful competition where it already exists
and needs only to be released from restraints that violate the
antitrust laws. To separate the operating units of going concerns without more supporting evidence than has been presented
here to establish either the need for, or the feasibility of, such
34
separation would amount to an abuse of discretion.
The Court's reluctance to resolve this basic issue in favor of the
Government was perhaps due in large part to the Government's failure
33. 63 F.Supp. 513 (S.D. N.Y. 1945), aff'd, 332 U.S. 319 (1947).
34. 332 U.S. 319, 352, 353 (1947).

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
to prove the need for, or practicability and feasibility of, divestiture
relief. The Government never made an overwhelming case for, or
presented preponderant evidence in favor of, the type of relief requested.
It did not allay the fears of the Court concerning the effect of a divestiture decree on the efficiency of the successor companies, nor was the
probative benefit of divestiture for the re-establishment of competition
in the industry shown. It neither demonstrated that the principal titanium
plants .of the defendants were adapted to separate ownership and independent operation, nor did it establish the compelling need for the particular remedy requested in any scheme to free this growing industry
from the fetters of the dominant defendant firms.3 5 The failure to show
that the "tough" competition which allegedly existed in this industry, in
fact, merely took the form of sales rivalry between two nominally independent firms was unfortunate. The impression seems inescapable that
had the Government devoted as much energy toward establishing the
appropriateness of the relief requested as it did to proving a violation
of the law, the Court might have granted a more drastic, yet more
effective, remedy. 0
Had the Government done so, the Court might have appreciated
more fully the need for structural reorganization-a mild one, at that-of a highly concentrated industry. The statement by one of du Pont's
general managers that competition in titanium pigments was "tough" and
"plenty tough"3 7 might not have been so readily accepted. The Court
might not have shuddered at the idea of cutting "living tissue" or of
disturbing a delicately adjusted oligopolistic machine. Convinced of the
necessity, fairness, practicability and feasibility of divestiture the Court
might have been more willing to accept the Government's proposal for
an effective remedy.
Even if it is granted, however, that the Government did not present
the strongest possible evidence to support its demand for divestiture, it
35. Such proof is, of course, very difficult. But by making use of factual economic
and technological data and 'by drawing from the experience and opinions of experts
in the field, the Government could do much to alleviate the judicial reluctance to employ
the more drastic but more effective remedies of dissolution, divorcement, and divestiture.
See Dession, The Trial of Econwmic and Techwlogical Issues of Fact, 58 YALE L.J. 1019
(1949), for a discussion of the judicial and legal techniques and considerations involved
in such proceedings.
36. There has been judicial recognition that the Government cannot establish with
certainty the economic effect a given course of action will have in the future. Hence,
the rule arose that all doubts regarding remedies should be resolved in favor of the
Government and against an adjudged monopolist. See Hartford Empire Co. v. United
States, 323 U.S. 286, 409 (1945); United States v. Bausch and Lomb Co., 321 U.S.
707, 726 (1944). Unfortunately, despite this rule, the Government has found it difficult
to establish the propriety of an effective remedy.
37. 332 U.S. 319, 352 (1947).
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is still doubtful whether the Court used valid (and economically meaningful) criteria for choosing an appropriate remedy. As Justice Douglas, in
a vigorous dissenting opinion, pointed out:
The task of putting an end to monopolistic practices and
restoring competition is one of magnitude and complexity;
Congress has authorized use of the broadest powers of equity to
cope with it ....

The [court's] powers under the antitrust laws,

though not specifically enumerated, are ample to thwart the
plans of those who would build illegal empires, no matter how
imaginative their undertakings or subtle their techniques. The
power of the court is not limited to the restraint of future transgressions. The impairment of property rights is no barrier to
the fashioning of a decree which will grant effective relief ....
Divestiture or dissolution may be ordered in spite of hardship,
inconvenience, or loss ....

Devices or instrumentalities which

may be used for legitimate ends may nevertheless be outlawed
entirely where they have been employed to build the monopoly
or to create the restraint of trade .... as
This view was nevertheless rejected, with the result that"the decree
approved by the Court stopped short of granting effective relief. Divestiture was refused and, while compulsory licensing was ordered, it was
put on a "reasonable royalty" instead of a royalty-free basis. Moreover,
any company which applied for a license from the defendants had to be
prepared reciprocally to license its own patents to the defendants. In
both these respects, the Court increased the odds against the restoration
of competition in this industry. It forced independents and potential
ndwcomers to pay royalties on misused patents and to surrender one of
their few competitive advantages-the exclusive right to use such patents
as they might possess. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the
National Lead decision did little to stimulate the entry of newcomers
into the titanium pigment industry. 39
The case of United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co.40 which, in
many respects, is a "sequel" to the National Lead case, is significant
because it indicates a growing trend against the liberal granting of
divestiture by the Supreme Court. Moreover, the case is important because it demonstrates the rather dubious grounds on which the Court
can refuse-and, in the foreseeable future, is likely to refuse-divestiture
relief in any manner or form.
38. Id. at 366, 367.
39. For a penetrating discussion of this case, see Zlinkoff and Barnard, The Supreme
Court and a Competitive Economy: 1946 Term, 47 COL. L. REv. 914, 933-948 (1947).
40. 83 F.Supp. 284 (N.D. Ohio 1949), modified and aff'd, 71 Sup.Ct. 971 (1951).
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The amended complaint was filed December 15, 1947, and charged
Timken and two foreign corporations (which were named co-conspirators
but not defendants) with engaging in an unlawful conspiracy ind combination to restrain foreign commerce by entering into agreements to
eliminate competition in the manufacture and sale of anti-friction bearings in all markets of the world.
On March 3, 1949, the district court filed an opinion, 4 1 which it
thereafter adopted as its findings of facts and conclusions of law,
declaring the defendant guilty of having violated Sections 1 and 3 of the
Sherman Act. After considering and rejecting all of the various defenses
raised by Timken in the course of the trial, Judge Freed held that the
defendant, together with British Timken and French Timken (its coconspirators), had unlawfully combined and conspired to restrain foreign
commerce by: (1) dividing the world among themselves into exclusive
sales and production territories;42 (2) fixing prices on all sales made
into territories assigned to another member of the conspiracy; 4 3 (3) cooperating to protect each others' markets and to eliminate competition
from outsiders ;44 and (4) participating in foreign cartels which restricted exports from and imports into, the United States. 4 ; Judge Freed
concluded that the restraints involved were not only illegal per se, but
were entered into with the clear intent of controlling "commerce in the
tapered bearing industry throughout the entire world. ' ' 46
On the basis of these findings, the district court entered a final judgment 47 which enjoined, among others, the following practices: (1)
exclusive exchange of know-how, patents, material and machinery
between Timken and its co-conspirators; (2) agreement between defendant, British Timken, French Timken, or their subsidiaries, agents, sales
representatives, or distributors to fix prices for the sale or resale of
bearings in the United States; (3) defendant's refusal to sell bearings
on the grounds that they are for resale or distribution in the territories
allotted by the conspiracy to British Timken or French Timken; and
(4) the defendant's entry into agreements with its co-conspirators for
the transfer of trade-mark rights upon restrictive conditions, such as
allocation of territories and exclusive exchange of know-how and
41.
42.
43.
44.

83 F.Supp. 284 (N.D. Ohio 1949).
Id. at 306, 307.
Id. at 306, 308.
Ibid.

45. Ibid.
46. Id. at 310.
47. The final judgment, as is so often the case, was not published.
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materials. 48 In addition, the district court ordered that the defendant
divest itself of its 30.25 per cent common stock interest in British Timken
9
and its 50 per cent common stock interest in French Timken.4
On appeal to the Supreme Court, 50 four major questions were
presented for review,- 1 namely: (1) whether defendant had in fact
combined with British Timken and French Timken to restrain foreign
commerce by allocating world markets, fixing prices, and restricting
competition in the sale of anti-friction bearings; (2) whether the restraints were reasonable as ancillary to a "joint venture" or to the
"licensing" of the trademark "Timken"; (3) whether the evidence at
the trial and the findings of the district court supported the judgment;
and (4) whether the divestiture and injunctive relief ordered by the
lower court were appropriate- and necessary. With the exception of
divestiture, the Supreme Court, on June 4, 1951, resolved all of these
issues in favor of the Government.52 By a vote of 4 to 3, however, th&
Court refused divestiture and 'thus added another to the Government's
long list of Pyrrhic victories in the enforcement of the antitrust laws. 5A
The Court's refusal to grant divestiture in this case was apparently
motivated by two major considerations. One was a feeling that a more
liberal rule of reason should be applied to international trade arrangements under the Sherman Act, even though similar arrangements under
similar circumstances in domestic commerce might be deemed unreasonable. The second was that divestiture is a harsh remedy, that it should
not be used to punish but to correct, and that it should not be employed
if "effective" alternatives are available. How valid are these objections
48. The injunctions are contained in paragraphs V-IX of the district court's final
judgment.

49. Paragraph VIII, final judgment.
50. The direct appeal of this case to the Supreme Court was allowed under Section
2 of the Expediting Act of 1903, 32 STAT. 823 (1903), 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1946), as
amended by Section 17 of the Act of June 25, 1948, 62 STAT. 869 (1948), 15 U.S.C.
§29 (Supp. 1950).
51. Actually, defendant attacked the district court decision in 206 assignments of
error, including 69 alleged errors in the findings of fact, 26 in the conclusions of law,
and 62 based on the court's refusal to make new and additional findings. In spite
of the fact that the Supreme Court considered these assignments as unduly repetitious
and-in part-frivolous, it nevertheless agreed to consider the appeal. Cf. Local 167 v.
United States, 291 U.S. 293, 296 (1934); Phillips & Colby Constr. Co. v. Seymour,

91 U.S. 646, 648 (1876).
52. 71 Sup.Ct 971 (1951).
53. The court was strangely divided on this case. Justices Black, Douglas and
Minton signed the majority opinion, Reed wrote a concurring opinion in which Vinson
joined, Jackson and Frankfurter wrote separate dissenting opinions, while Burton and
Clark did not participate. On the divestiture issue Black, Douglas and Minton voted
to uphold the district court, while Reed, Vinson, Jackson and Frankfurter voted to
reverse the lower court judgment.
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to divestiture relief when viewed in terms of the facts brought out during
the trial and in terms of the precedents developed by the Court in similar
cases?
First, as to the application of the rule of reason in international
trade cases, defendant had contended-and Justices Jackson and Frankfurter apparently agreed-that the obstacles to foreign commerce created
by tariff barriers, quota restrictions, governmental limitations on foreign
exchange, etc., were such as to effectively foreclose any major invasion
of foreign markets by Timken and of domestic markets by the coconspirators. The defendant had further urged that, since a reciprocal
invasion of market territories was impossible even if divestiture was
granted, a divestiture decree by the Court would merely operate as a
penalty against defendant rather than as a measure of relief against past
and future violations of the law. 54
Justice Jackson, in his dissenting opinion, accepted this view and
concluded that "this decision will restrain more trade than it will make
free." 55 In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Frankfurter expressed
a similar view. After stating that "even 'cartel' is not a talismanic word,
so as to displace the rule of reason by which breaches of the Sherman
Law are determined,"5 6 he urged that the rule of reason be applied more
liberally in the international trade field, and that arrangements which
might be deemed unreasonable in domestic commerce be, under certain
circumstances, considered reasonable when involving foreign commerce. 57
While the Jackson and Frankfurter opinions, theoretically at least,
seem plausible they are not supported by the facts of this case. As the
district court, in an explicit and comprehensive finding, held, "all that
the evidence discloses is an intent to form a smoothly operating combination to control commerce in the tapered bearing industry throughout the
54. Brief for Appellants, pp. 22-28, 196-198, Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United
States, 71 Sup.Ct. 971 (1951).
55. 71 Sup.Ct. 971, 979 (1951).

"...

not all agreements are conspiracies and

not all restraints of trade are unlawful. In a world of tariffs, trade barriers, empire
or domestic preferences, and various forms of parochialism from which we are by no
means free, I think a rule that it is restraint of trade to enter a foreign market
through a separate subsidiary of limited scope is virtually to foreclose foreign commerce
of many kinds." Ibid.
56. 71 Sup.Ct. 971, 978 (1951).
57. "Of course, it is not for this Court to formulate economic policy as to foreign
commerce. But the conditions controlling foreign commerce may be relevant here.
When as a matter of cold fact the legal, financial, and government policies deny
opportunities for exportation from this country and importation into it, arrangements
that afford such opportunities to American enterprise may not fall under the ban of a
fair construction of the Sherman Law because comparable arrangements regarding
domestic commerce come within its condemnation." Ibid.
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entire world."58 The agreements and conspiracy into which the defendant
had entered, in addition to being illegal per se, could not even be justified
by "good business reasons," and could hardly be regarded as an attempt
to compete under the difficult conditions confronting world trade.
The record reveals that, not only did the conspirators refrain from
selling outside their allocated territory, but also prevented their customers
from doing so. Sales of bearings for replacement purposes outside of
allocated territories, though permitted by the contracts between the
conspirators, were discouraged by a penalty or "commission" of 10 per
cent (later 5 per cent) imposed on such sales.5 9 Furthermore, even where
this penalty was imposed, the prices charged were regularly fixed by
agreement among the parties. 60 The record reveals that, by mutual
understanding, each party to the conspiracy, when selling replacement
parts for export into the other's territory, charged substantially higher
prices (i.e. imposed a "protective" discount) than on similar sales within
its own territory.61 American Timken, although it was not actually a
party to any cartel agreements, cooperated and consulted with British
Timken and French Timken in organizing them, and approved the
agreements before they were executed, all as part of a plan to eliminate.
outside (including American) competition.6 2 Finally, the record reveals
that, as a result of its own restrictive covenants, the defendant could not,
in many parts of the world, use the "Timken" trade-mark in competition
63
with its British and French co-conspirators.
From an examination of the record it would appear, therefore, that
Timken was hardly the victim of the difficult circumstances surrounding
world trade; that Timken, far from attempting to expand world trade,
did everything in its power to contain and restrict it; that instead of being
a silent and unwilling partner to a conspiracy imposed on it by external
necessity, Timken was a prime mover in the division of the world into
non-competitive spheres from which outsiders were excluded and in
which the conspirators behaved in accordance with an "orderly" and
"rational" mode of conduct characteristic of international cartels.
Perhaps the most telling answer to the Frankfurter-Jackson position
was provided by the district court itself when it inquired why, if competition between Timken and its co-conspirators was impossible, did
Timken need to enter into restrictive agreements in the first place, and
58. 83 F.Supp. 284, 310 (N.D. Ohio 1949).

59. Id. at 293, 294, 298.
60. Id. at 298, 301, 306.
61. Id. at 301, 306.
62. Id. at 304, 307.

63. Id. at 314.
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why has itsince then so vigorously defended its right to continue them.6 4
Why, if divestiture was a vain and futile gesture in any attempt to
restore competition, did Timken so vehemently oppose this form of
relief ?
It is unfortunate indeed that neither the defendant, nor Justices
Jackson or Frankfurter, specifically demonstrated how the existence of
tariffs and other trade barriers hampered Timken in its efforts to sell
tapered bearings abroad. It is unfortunate that neither the defendant,
nor the Justices who upheld its position, specifically indicated how the
combination and contractual agreements into which Timken entered
promoted world trade, in general, and exports from, or imports to, the
United States, in particular. It is regrettable that Justice Frankfurter
failed to explain the exact manner in which he would have applied his
more "liberal" rule of reason to the specific facts of this case. Finally,
it seems incongruous that Justice Frankfurter, while recognizing that
"it is not for this Court to formulate economic policy as to foreign
commerce," nevertheless chose to write an opinion which would make
the foreign commerce provisions of the Sherman Act a dead letter and
thus, institute a drastic change in the law which only Congress has the
power to make.
The second major reason for the Court's refusal of divestiture relief
was set forth in the Reed-Vinson concurring opinion which held that
"[s] ince divestiture is a remedy to restore competition and not to punish
those who restrain trade, it is not to be used indiscriminately, without
regard to the type of violation or whether other effective methods, less
harsh, are available."' 65 In urging upon the Court the same judicial
6 G
restraint that was followed in United States v. National Lead Co.,
Justice Reed argued that a divestiture order in this case was excessively
severe, and that such an order was unnecessary since injunctive relief
would prove adequate in terminating the illegal conspiracy and in restoring competition. 7 By thus relying on a series of injunctions, backed by
64. "If all the impediments to foreign trade existed ever since 1914, which became
more and more pronounced to the present day, why were the contracting parties,
defendant, British Timken and French Timken so concerned about airtight agreements
to keep each one within its own commercial domain?. The repeated and persistent
provisions of the successive contracts, for territorial restrictions, contradict any claim
of lack of ability to compete." 83 F.Supp. 284, 317 (S.D. Ohio 1949).

65. 71 Sup.Ct. 971, 977 (1951).
66. See pp. 13-15, supra.
67. "An injunction was entered by the District Court to prohibit the continuation
of the objectionable contracts. Violation of that injunction would threaten the appellant and its officers with civil and criminal contempt . . . . The paucity of cases dealing
with contempt of Sherman, Act injunctions is, I think, -an indication of how carefully
the decrees are obeyed . . . . Prompt and full compliance with [this] decree should
be anticipated." 71 Sup.Ct. 971, 978 (1951).
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the threat of civil and criminal contempt, Justice Reed thought that the
purpose and functions of the Sherman Act would effectively be served.
That this view is rather naive should be self-evident. The paucity
of cases dealing with contempt of Sherman Act injunctions is probably
evidence, not of how carefully such decrees are obeyed, but rather of
the ease with which they are evaded and the niggardly appropriations
made available for their surveillance. Moreover, the past record of
prison sentences and fines imposed on individual defendants for antitrust violations makes the threat of contempt against corporate officials
an empty threat indeed. Finally, even if we assume that the injunctions
in the present case will be observed with punctilious exactitude, it is
questionable whether these injunctions-absent divestiture--would add
much to what the Sherman Act already prohibits per se.
Unfortunately, the Reed-Vinson opinion not only fails to substantiate the adequacy of the injunctive relief, standing by itself, but also
does violence to three important precedents developed by the Court in
previous divestiture cases. Thus, the Reed-Vinson position seems to
ignore a previous ruling by the Court that divestiture may be required
not only where a stock acquisition was itself a violation of the antitrust
laws, but also where the acquisition, though lawful, was part of a
conspiracy to suppress competition. As the Court stated in the Paramtount 8 case:
To the extent that these acquisitions were the fruits of
monopolistic practices or restraints of trade, they should be
divested ....

Moreover, even if lawfully acquired, they may

have been utilized as part of the conspiracy to eliminate or
suppress competition in ftirtherance of the ends of the conspiracy. In that event divestiture would likewise be justified
Furthermore, if the joint ownership is an alliance with one
who is or would be an operator but for the joint ownership,
divorce should be decreed even though the affiliation was innocently acquired. For that joint ownership would afford
opportunity to perpetuate the effects of the restraints of trade
which the . . . defendants have inflicted on the industry. 69
The Reed-Vinson opinion also does violence to the ruling of the
Crescenit7 case. There the Court held that the inducement to avoid
competition, which was afforded by a conspiratorial stock affiliation
between potential competitors, warranted effective assurance, through
68. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
69. Id. at 152-153.
70. United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173 (1944).
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divestiture, that the opportunity therefor would be unavailable in the
future. In explaining the necessity of divestiture in such cases, the Court
had recognized that "the government should not be confined to an
injunction against further violations," and that:
[T]he relief need not, and under these facts should not, be so
restricted. The fact that the companies were affiliated induced
joint action, and agreement. Common control was one of the
instruments in bringing about unity of purpose and unity of
action and in making the conspiracy effective. If-that affiliation
continues, there will be tempting opportunity for these [defendants] . . .to continue to act in combination against the inde-

pendents. The proclivity in the past to use that affiliation for
an unlawful end warrants effective assurance that no such
opportunity will be available in the future. Hence we do not
think the District Court has abused its discretion in failing to
limit the relief to an injunction against future violations. There
is no reason why the protection of the public interest should
depend solely on that somewhat cumbersome procedure when
another effective one is available. 71
The Reed-Vinson opinion further seems t'o ignore the previous
rulings by the Court that those who violate the Sherman Act may "not
avoid an undoing of their unlawful project on the plea of hardship or
inconvenience" 7 2 and that "the policy of the antitrust laws is not qualified
or conditioned by" the disadvantages or inconvenience which the judgment provisions may cause to those whose conduct is regulated. 7 3 On the
basis of these precedents- Justices Reed and Vinson could easily have
rejected defendant's plea that hardship, inconvenience and loss of profit
would result from the divestiture order of the lower court. They could
have rejected this plea on the simple ground that the alleged hardship
was immaterial as a matter of law.
Indeed, Justices Reed and Vinson could have gone beyond precedent
and pointed out that the alleged hardship, even if material as a matter of
law, was doubtful and speculative as a matter of fact. To be sure,
defendant had urged that, under a divestiture judgment, the sale of its
stock in British Timken and French Timken would be difficult; that
serious financial losses would be involved in the sale; that defendant
would be unable to realize in dollars on securities sold in Great Britain;
and that it would suffer losses through the payment of taxes on gains
from the sales.
71. Id. at 189-190.

72. Id. at 189.
73. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 159 (1948).
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While these contentions appear plausible, they are more speculative
than real. In the first place, there is, as the record shows, a regular
market for British Timken shares, since they are listed on the London
Stock Exchange and also traded on the "switch-pound" market in New
York. In addition, there is a market which can be tapped through
privately negotiated sales or syndicate operations. Secondly, the price
at which the shares were to have been sold need not have been artificially
depressed by offering them all at one time or in large blocks. The
district court decree proposed to allow a two-year period for the sale
of the stock, thus providing adequate flexibility for advantageous disposition." 4 Thirdly, there would appear to be little danger that defendant could not realize American dollars from the sale of its British or
French holdings. If the securities were sold in the United States, there
would, of course, be no problem of currency conversion. But even if the
securities were sold abroad, the National Lead experience indicates that
the conversion problem is not insuperable. As the Government informed
the Court, defendants in that case had used the proceeds from an
enforced stock sale to purchase British Government bonds (which pay
3 to 42 per cent interest withdrawable immediately in dollars) the
principal of which may be withdrawn in dollars upon maturity and, in
some cases, before maturity. 7 5 In the light of the record and the testimony

by some of defendant's own witnesses, it would appear that the hardship
which would allegedly have ensued from divestiture was, to say the
least, doubtful and speculative."
We may conclude, therefore, that Justices Reed and Vinson erred
in their refusal to grant divestiture. Since they both concurred with
the district court finding that defendant's investments in potentially
competing companies were carried out as part of an illegal conspiracy to
suppress competition; agreed with the finding that these investments
served initially, and have continued to serve, as an inducement to defendant not to compete with British Timken and Fiench Timken; must have
had cognizance of previous Court rulings authorizing divestiture (a)
where the acquisition of stock investments was itself illegal, or (b) where
the investments-though lawfully acquired-were utilized as part of
an unlawful conspiracy to restrain trade, or (c) where the investments
74. Paragraph VIII(A), final judgment
75. Brief for the Government, p. 12, United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co.,

83 F.Supp. 284 (N.D. Ohio 1949).
76. "Defendant's argument that it will have heavy taxes to pay upon any gain
from the sale of its foreign investments cannot be said to be a hardship argument, for
it is flatly inconsistent with the. position that defendant will suffer any loss from the
sale. Taxes are due, on defendant's own assumption, only in the event of profit or
capital gain resulting from the enforced sale." Ibid.
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served as an inducement to restrain competition; must have recalled that
even in the National Lead case (which they quoted with approval)-to
the extent that it involved an illegal division of world territoriesdefendant was ordered to divest itself of its foreign stock interests because "the stock acquisitions were part and parcel of the territorial allocation agreements ; ' 7 7 must have realized that the prospective hardship
flowing from divestiture rested more upon allegations of defense counsel
than upon evidence developed at the trial; should have recognized that the
injunctive provisions of the decree did not go much beyond the per se
prohibitions already existing under the Sherman Act; should have known
that the threat of civil and criminal contempt does not by itself assure
compliance with an injunctive decree; and finally, should have resolved
doubts as to the efficacy of relief in favor of the Government and against
7
the conspirators, T---for
all these reasons, we believe that divestiture in
this case should have been authorized.
In appraising the results of the Timken case one cannot help but
wonder why the majority refused to allow divestiture; why they rejected
the Black-Douglas-Minton view that "obviously the most effective way
to suppress further Sherman Act violations is to end the intercorporate
relationship which has been the core of the conspiracy. ' 79 Does the
Court act unwittingly? Does the Court unconsciously condone what the
antitrust laws were designed to prevent? In short, does the Court propose
to stand idly by while America's foreign trade is recreated in the image
of the Old World cartels?
The manner in which the dissolution, divorcement and divestiture
remedy is implemented is of crucial importance in attaining the antimonopoly objectives of the Sherman Act. This fact is demonstrated by
the case of United States v. Pidlnn Co.80
The complaint in that case was filed on July 12, 1940, charging
Pullman, Inc., three subsidiaries thereof, and 31 individuals with viola-7
tion of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and Section 3 of the
Clayton Act. The Government charged that the defendants had secured
a monopoly in the operation and servicing of sleeping cars by buying
out competitors and by making contracts with the railroads for exclusive
77. 332 U.S. 319, 363 (1947).
See Local 167 v. United States, 291 U.S. 293, 299 (1934), where doubts concerning the scope of relief were thus resolved.
79. 71 Sup.Ct. 971, "976 (1951).
80. 50 F.Supp. 123 (E.D. Pa. 1943) ; 53 F.Supp. 908 (E.D. Pa. 1944) ; 64 F.Supp.
108 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
-78.
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operating and servicing rights. The Government also charged that the
defendants had conspired to monopolize the ma ufactare of sleeping cars.
Pullman, Inc. was a holding company controlling The Pullman Company, Pullman-Standard Car Manufacturing Company, and Pullman
Car & Manufacturing Corporation of Alabama. Together, these companies exercised vertically integrated domination of the manufacture and
operation of sleeping cars in the United States.
The Pullman Company (the operating subsidiary) was engaged in
the business of operating sleeping, parlor, private and miscellaneous cars
for railroads. By 1940 it had achieved a complete monopoly in the
operating field by systematically acquiring competitors, coercing railroads into signing operating contracts, and forcing railroads to deal
exclusively with Pullman."' The company thus exercised a stranglehold
from which no important railroad could escape. The reason is obvious:
a substantial part of all sleeping car travel involves the use of connecting
carriers. Even if a railroad could operate its own sleeping car service,
it could not send its sleeping cars over the lines of connecting carriers
with which The Pullman Company had contracts, or-if these Pullman
contracts were abrogated-without then entering into numerous complicated contracts for the exchange of cars.
The Pullman-Standard Car Manufacturing Company and Pullman
Car & Manufacturing Corporation of Alabama were the manufacturing
subsidiaries of Pullman, Inc. Together these companies exercised a
virtual monopoly in the making of sleeping, parlor, dining, and similar
cars. The monopoly in the manufacture of these cars was secured by
The Pullman Company's refusal to operate any cars not manufactured
by the Pullman organization. This refusal was, in turn, made effective
by The Pullman Company's operating monopoly and its agreement to
own and use only cars produced by Pullman-Standard. Since the railroads were dependent on Pullman service for carrying first-class passengers, the Pullman organization had the power to restrain these railroads
from buying certain types of cars from other manufacturers. Thus,
although there were a number of manufacturing companies in 1940
capable of producing sleeping car equipment, 2 they were not able to do
so as long as Pullman exercised its vertically integrated control over
the industry.
The economic effects of the integrated monopoly in the operation
and manufacture of sleeping cars were clear: since the Pullman operating
81. 50 F.Supp. 123, 127 (E.D. Pa. 1943).
82. Ibid-
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company had no competitive incentive to lower rates or to improve its
equipment, it exacted excessive charges for its services and operated a
83
fleet of obsolete cars.
The railroads were exploited in many ways. They were required to
guarantee Pullman a minimum profit on all cars used and could share
only part of the profits earned in excess of such minimum. 4 (The railroads thus took all risks of loss, but were rewarded with only part of
any accrued profits.) They were required to pay in some instances 75
per cent and in others more than 100 per cent of the total cost of air
conditioning sleeping cars, in spite of the fact that the air conditioning
equipment became a fixture of the Pullman car and the property of The
Pullman Company. 5 Pullman also forced contracting railroads to pay
for all improvements on "standard" equipment cars, in spite of the fact
that such cars were built on a model more than 20 years.old and in spite
of the fact that the improvements became the property of The Pullman
Company. 6 The company thus exacted non-competitive and excessive
prices and terms for the operation of sleeping car services.
The consumers suffered not only from the arbitrary rates on sleeping
car services, but also from the inadequate facilities provided. For two
decades, prior to 1940, there was no important change in the type of
car operated by Pullman and a substantial number of the sleeping cars
owned by the company were more than 20 years old.87 Because of
Pullman's ability to restrain other car manufacturers from marketing
their product, the consumer did not receive the benefit of improved equipment kept up to the standards of speed, comfort, and convenience made
possible by advances in rolling stock construction.
The unreasonably high profits earned by Pullman over the years
were another effect of monopoly. While the I.C.C. had the same regulatory power over the fares of The Pullman Company as over the fares
of other common carriers, the Commission never chose to fix either
maximum or minimum fares and charges. The Pullman rates in effect
in 1940 were not fixed by the Commission but were initiated by The
Pullman Company pursuant to its own monopolistic price policies. Since
the manufacturing subsidiary of the Pullman organization was not
subject to I.C.C. supervision, any regulation of the operating company's
83.
84.
85.
86.
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rates was incapable of preventing exploitation and the accumulation of
excess profits.88
Finally, the Pullman monopoly resulted in the limitation and restriction of sleeping, parlor, and dining car production; in the suppression of
developments in modern car construction; in discrimination between
railroads in the terms for operating sleeping cars; and in the exclusion
of companies eager to embark upon the manufacture of sleeping cars and
similar equipment.
When the court's decision in the case was announced on April 20,
1943, the Government seemed to have won a complete victory. It was
held there had been a violation of the Sherman Act in both manufacture
and operation of sleeping cars. The court directed that the final decree
provide for*divorcement of the operating company from the manufacturing company; that The Pullman Company be required to operate and
service sleeping cars of any manufacture tendered to it for operation;
that any railroad be allowed to operate its own sleeping car business;
that The Pullman Company be required to furnish through-line sleeping
car service to any railroad; and that the company eliminate its exclusive
dealing contracts with the railroads.8 9
The decision left one vital question unanswered, namely, whether
Pullman, Inc. should dispose of its operating or manufacturing subsidiary. On January 22, 1944, this question was resolved by leaving the
election between the two alternatives to Pullman, Inc.,9 0 a step which
foreshadowed the inadequate relief which the Government was eventually
to obtain in this case.
Judge Biggs, in his dissent, recognized the drawbacks inherent in
the court decision. He argued that the Pullman organization, rather
than being allowed a choice in the matter, should be required to sell the
manufacturing part of its business. Judge Biggs reasoned, as follows:
If permitted a choice, Pullman will almost certainly elect to retain the
manufacturing subsidiary and sell the operating company. It would
be extremely difficult to find a bona fide independent purchaser for the
operating company, thus necessitating a sale of its facilities to the railroads. 91 Judge Biggs did not relish this prospect. Moreover, he thought
88. This situation is quite typical of vertically integrated public utilities, where the
operating subsidiary is subject to public regulations, but the manufacturing subsidiary
is not. Cf. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATION OF
THE TELEPHONE INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES, 74th Cong., Ist Sess. (1939).

89. 50 F.Supp. 123, 137 (E.D. Pa. 1943).
90. 53 F.Supp. 908 (E.D. Pa. 1944).

91. Judge Biggs discussed the problems raised by railroad ownership of the Pullman operating company as follows: "Who will police the operations of the pool in
order to make sure that those carriers who contribute to the purchase of Pullman
Company stock . . . will treat their partners in the joint enterprises or the public
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it was a "striking anomaly that the tort-feasor, Pullman-Standard, should
be left in a position where it can profit greatly by way of the monopoly
from the sale of light-weight sleeping cars in the postwar market."' 92
However, Judge Biggs did not prevail. As he had predicted and in
accordance with the court's judgment, Pullman elected to, sell its operating
business. After extensive negotiations, it accepted the purchase offer
made jointly by railroads doing over 95 per cent of the nation's passenger business. The court approved acceptance of this offer, and on March
31, 1947, the Supreme Court, being equally divided, affirmed without
opinion. 93 This brought to an end seven years of litigation in the
course of which divorcement was granted. Yet, instead of being used
as a means to provide an open market, the separation of Pullman's
operating and manufacturing subsidiaries came to be regarded as an end
in itself.
The sale of Pullman's operating facilities to the railroads was
unfortunate. It created the potential danger of: (1) vesting in the railroads monopoly control of a nationwide competing system of transportation; (2) perpetuating the Pullman manufacturing monopoly; and (3)
resulting in discrimination against the smaller railroads.
As to the danger of monopoly control over competing transportation
systems, the Government had argued that:
[P]urchase of The Pullman Company by the railroads would
reduce to common ownership and control an important part of
the passenger transportation system of the United States. There
is no qualitative difference between common ownership of Pullman cars and common ownership of all rail passenger cars.
Common ownership of the sleeping car business would be unlike
individual ownership by the railroads of all passengers coaches.
In the passenger coach field the railroads compete for coach
travel. They own all the coaches but ownership is individual,
not common. Incentive to compete among themselves as to
sleeping car service. . . as well as to make sleeping car service
competitive with coach service will be lacking under common
ownership. . . . Competition between coach and sleeping car
service will be eliminated. As in all cases involving large investments the inevitable tendency, absent competition, is to use the
existing equipment until it is completely worn out.
There is the same objection to railroad ownership of sleeping
cars as there would be if the railroads were to purchase all
without discrimination? I know of no power presently vested in the Interstate Commerce
Commission or in any other government agency which would enable it to regulate
such a pool operation." Id. at 910.

92. Ibid.
93. 330 U.S. 806 (1947), rehearing denied, 331 U.S. 865 (1947).
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passenger busses, or all of the air lines or all of the water transportation. In any of these situations such a purchase would
permit the railroads to monopolize an important means of public
transportation and suppress or develop it as they chose, regardless of public needs. It would vest in the railroads monopoly
control of a competing system of transportation. .... 04
As to the danger of perpetuating Pullman's manufacturing monopoly, the Government had argued that:
[S]ale of The Pullman Company to the railroads may easily
defeat the express order of the Court directing complete separation of the operating company from the manufacturing company. This is occasioned by the existence of interlacing relations
among several large banks and insurance companies, Pullman
Incorporated and the railroads. The Morgan, Vanderbilt, and
Mellon interests have substantial representation on the present
directorate of Pullman Incorporated which has elected to retain
ownership of Pullman-Standard Car Manufacturing Company.
These financial interests likewise dominate a large number of
the great railroads of the country, both through ownership,
and more importantly, through the financial syndicates which
float the securities of such railroads. Equally important in the
financial operations of the railroads and Pullman Incorporated are several of the largest insurance companies which
invest in railway securities.9 5
From the evidence at hand, the Government had concluded that through
the:
...

banker and insurance nexus the railroads are affiliated with

Pullman Incorporated which owns, and will continue to own,
Pullman-Standard Car Manufacturing Company. If they purchase the operating company the railroads might still purchase
substantially all of their sleeping car requirements from the
Pullman-Standard Car Manufacturing Company. If the
Court's decree is to become effective and competition restored
in the sleeping car operating and the sleeping car manufacturing fields, such affiliations must be avoided.96
Pointing to the danger of discrimination against the smaller railroads,
the Government had warned that:
[S] ale of the sleeping car business to the railroads might cause a
marked deterioration in the service on small roads. Under the
94. Brief for United States, p. 3, United States v. Pullman Co., 64 F.Supp. 108
(E.D. Pa. 1946).
95. Id. at 6.

96. Id. at 7.
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plan submitted by the railroads the stock would be distributed
in accordance with the percentage of sleeping cars operated by
the several railroads. This means that the twenty railroads
making the offer would own 81 per cent of the stock and would
effectively control the policies of the new company. The smaller
roads would get only such types of equipment and services
that the controlling roads did not want, thus lessening the
smaller road's ability to compete for traffic. The small roads
would become captives of the large roads. The public traveling
on small roads would be required to use inferior accommodathe larger roads supplying
tions or shift their patronage to
97
more desirable accommodations.
In spite of these objections, the sale of the Pullman operating
subsidiary to the railroads was given judicial sanction. Similar approval
was granted by the I.C.C. on May 6, 1947, after a finding that "the
proposed pooling will be in the interest of better service to the public
and of economy in operation," and that such pooling "will not unduly
restrain competition." 98 With this opinion, litigation in the Pullman case
came to an end.
What did the seven years of litigation accomplish? What affirmative relief was obtained? How effective was that relief in destroying
monopoly power and restoring vigorous competition? To be sure, Pullman's manufacturing and operating business were divorced. The new
railroad-owned servicing company was required to purchase new cars
on the basis of competitive bidding. The railroads promised that, after
an interim three-year period, the jointly owned servicing company would
be sold to a purchaser not connected with either the railroads or Pullman, Inc. o9 Finally, the new operating company was required to provide, upon request, service for cars not owned by it. The suit has thus
succeeded in removing some of Pullman's monopolistic restraints which
previously prevented the railroads from purchasing and owning sleeping cars operated over their lines. The decree made possible, to some
extent, the entry of newcomers into the manufacture of sleeping cars
and similar equipment. It.put an end to the exploitation of the railroads by the Pullman organization.
On the other side of the ledger, however, must be entered the
failure to provide for the financial as well as physical divorcement of
Pullman's subsidiaries. The number and strength of interlocking directorships between Pullman, Inc. -and the railroads (or companies which
97. Id. at 8.
98. 268 I.C.C. 473, 492 (1947).
99. Thig sale has not as yet taken place and an extension of the "interim" period
has recently been authorized by the I.C.C. See 276 I.C.C 5 (1949).
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ate the source of railroad financing) were left untouched. The Pullman
operating company was sold without requiring the would-be purchaser
to demonstrate its complete independence of all connections, direct or
indirect, with Pullman, Inc. In view of the financial ties between Pullman-Standard and the railroad-owned operating company, and in spite
of the "competitive bidding" provision, a potential newcomer in the manufacturing field was thus made to face considerable odds against his
successful entry.
Here a great opportunity was muffed. The courts could have
created three independent groups in the industry: (1) two or more
car manufacturers, (2) an independent operating company, and (3)
the railroads. This could have been done preferably by ordering the sale
of the Pullman manufacturing subsidiary to a bona fide independent
or by forcing the sale of the operating company to a bidder other than
the railroads. There would 'thus have come into being three stparate
groups whose economic self interest was such as to promote development of better equipment and service, competition between rival modes
of transportation, and freedom from monopolistic domination or influence over the manufacture of sleeping cars. Without punishing Pullman
for past offenses, provision could have been made for more effective
competition in the future.
As it turned out, the concentration of economic power was not
substantially lessened. The seat of monopoly power was merely transferred from a giant firm to a highly concentrated industry. Divorcement was obtained, but it was carried out in a manner which largely
ignored the economic realities of intercorporate relationships.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

To the extent that the above case studies are representative-and
an examination of the record would seem to indicate that they are' 00 we may conclude that the relief obtained by the Government in Section
2 cases under the Sherman Act has generally been inadequate; that the
Government, while successful in establishing the defendants' violation,
has not been able to secure the kind of remedy which would dissipate the
effects of monopoly and encourage the restoration of a more competitive
industrial structure; that the Government, therefore, has won many a
law suit but lost many a cause. 1 0 '
100. As stated supra note 18, United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S.
131 (1948), is the exception and not the rule.
101. In all fairness, however, it should be noted that the Antitrust Division has
attempted to overcome the apparently insuperable obstacles to divestiture by making
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There are many factors which explain the Government's failure,
except in a handful of cases, to get meaningful dissolution, divorcement
and divestiture relief. The most important factor is the attitude of the
courts to this problem. The courts have exhibited a disinclination to
undertake drastic economic reorganization of a monopolized industry
and have, therefore, often failed to establish the structural prerequisites
for vigorous competition. They have generally refrained from breaking
asunder what man has illegally joined together.
The "shyness" of the courts in this respect stems not only from
the temperament of many judges but also from a lack of training in the
economic problems involved in monopoly cases. Perhaps it is this lack
of comprehension of intricate economic forces rather than an unwillingness to grant drastic relief which is responsible for the ad hoc, uncomplicated and readily implemented remedies traditionally embraced by the
courts. Perhaps it is a lack of expertness in wielding the knife which
increasing use of the consent decree as a means of obtaining relief "just short" of
divestiture. Between 1935 and 1950, for example, 134 of the civil cases filed were'settled
by the consent procedures whereas only 37 cases were tried. See Timberg, Equitable
Relief under the Sherman Act, 1950 U. OF ILL. L. FoRuM 629, 630. Under the policy
now in force, consent decrees are negotiated in cases "where the Government feels
that there is an advantage in taking a present settlement that will immediately alleviate
the alleged restraints, instead of pursuing a protracted course of litigation that would
permit those restraints to continue for an indefinite future [compare the 'time utility'
of the economists] ; and where there are good, but not assured, possibilities that the
restraints will be removed by the operation of the judgment. Frequently, in these
situations, the defendants present an economic justification for less far-reaching relief
than the Department may have asked for in its complaint-a justification which the
Government is willing to test (without acquiescence) in the light of operations under
the judgment." Id. at 657.
As Timberg aptly points out, the Government, under the consent procedure, has
been able to secure certain forms of relief which had not generally been granted in'
litigated judgments. Thus a number of recent consent decrees have provided for the
dedication or royalty-free licensing of patents in -flat glass products, colored motion
picture film, plastics, automotive air brakes, magnetos, cast iron pressure pipe, railway
spring products, stainless steel, filters, glass bulbs, fiberglas, air conditioning equipment,
disconnecting switches, and stencil duplicating machines and supplies. Id. at 640, 641.
Some of these decrees have provided for the licensing of future patents, typically for
a five year period, as well as for the extensive disclosure of know-how to any applicant
either without payment or at actual cost. Many have included affirmative injunctive
provisions designed to forestall not only the precise violations charged but also all
similar violations. Finally, and perhaps most important, recent consent judgments
have contained the "Damocles' Sword" provision under which jurisdiction is retained
for from three to five years so that the Government may, at the end of the "probationary" period, petition for divestiture relief if competition has not been re-established
in the industry. While these decrees have been the vehicle for solving many of the
Government's difficult relief problems, their relatively recent origin makes it impossible
to appraise and evaluate their economic effectiveness. Unless it can be demonstrated
that competition has been successfully restored in industries where these decrees are
now operative, the consent procedure can hardly be embraced as an efficacious substitute
for dissolution, divorcement and divestiture.
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has made the courts so reluctant to sanction the drastic economic surgery
necessary to strike at the core of the monopoly cancer.
Another factor influencing the relief obtained in monopoly cases
is the method of presenting such cases to the courts. Since relief cannot
be obtained until the Government has proved a Section 2 violation, the
evidence is presented for the primary purpose of showing the existence
of monopoly. Usually the record contains little concerning the specifics
of relief, and relief problems are not considered until the conclusion of
the trial and the announcement of the court's opinion. In most cases,
therefore, the court has no evidence before it as to the nature of the
remedy necessary to neutralize the effects of the monopoly. It must
frequently proceed on the basis of conjecture as to what the Government's ultimate relief problems will be.
In addition, the preoccupation of the trial staff with developing
the kind of record which will substantiate its monopoly charges tends
to deemphasize the importance of a well-organized and comprehensive
plan for relief. The legal problem of "winning" the case is permitted
to take precedence over the economic problem of obtaining adequate
remedial action. There arises, therefore, a tendency to improvise relief
measures when reality demands that a concrete relief program be spelled
out. Often the trial attorneys "estimate" how much by way of relief
the judge is likely to grant rather than considering what kind of relief
is required to effectuate the purposes of the law. The result is that
frequently the battle is won while the war is lost.
The analysis of the above cases demonstrates to the writer that
the present system of presenting and deciding antitrust cases fails to
achieve the results demanded by the Sherman Act. The inadequacies
of present practices are mostly self-imposed by the courts and the Antitrust Division: the solution to the problem is within their domain. While
it is unlikely that the judges can be schooled in the intricacies of economic
theory or the complex pattern of economic reality, competent economic
counsel can be made available to assist them in the analysis of monopoly
cases, and to render assistance in the formulation of adequate relief
programs. The courts could either employ full-time economic experts
or call upon professional consultants from the ranks of industry, government, or the universities. 10 2 On the basis of -comprehensive industry
102. In a recent discussion of the relief problem in dissolution, divorcement and
divestiture cases, Professor Oppenheim makes the same recommendation. He points
out that "[u]pon the judges fall the final responsibility for interpreting the antitrust
remedies in concentration
laws and determining the appropriateness of the '.D.D.'
of economic power cases. It is most important, therefore, that consideration should
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studies by experts in the field, the courts might then more readily invoke
03
such "drastic" remedies as dissolution, divorcement and divestiture.'
While the Antitrust Division is aware of the difficult problems faced
in securing adequate relief, 0 4 it is recommended that its requests for
dissolution, divorcement and divestiture be based on more thorough-going
studies of relief alternatives. Such studies should be made by an adequate staff of economists, industry specialists, and engineers (within the
Antitrust Division) who possess the technical qualifications essential for
the development of a practical, yet economically meaningful and effective
relief program. A preponderance of evidence should be presented to
demonstrate that the relief proposals are not only iecessary but also
practical and feasible. The Government should attempt to prove, with
more convincing evidence than it has in the past, that dissolution,
divorcement and divestiture is, in particular cases, the only remedy
capable of neutralizing monopoly power and restoring competition in
accordance with the mandate of the Sherman Act. To establish the case
for its relief proposals, the Government might emphasize and effectively
demonstrate that a company's size is not necessarily the guarantor of
economic efficiency; that the company's favorable profit record is often
the result of its coercive power in the market place rather than its
efficiency of operation; that the dissolution of a giant might actually
enhance rather than diminish the efficiency of its operating components;
that dissolution in particular cases would not impair our ability effectively
to mobilize the country's resources in times of national emergency. Most
important of all, any remedy proposed must be specific; it must show
be given to appropriate methods of providing judges with assistance in the form of
sound and unbiased advice of economists. Such assistance would help the judges in
appraising the relative merits of opposing economic facts and views as developed in
the record of particular cases and upon which proof of antitrust violation and the
applicability and scope of remedies depend." Oppenheim, Divestiture as a Remedy
Under the FederalAntitrust Laws, 19 GEo. WASH. L. REy. 11, 130-131 (1950).
103. As an alternative to the above suggestion, the courts could make use of
Section 7 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which provides that: "In any suit
in equity brought by or under the direction of the Attorney General as provided in
the antitrust Acts, the court may, upon the conclusion of the testimony therein, if it
shall be then of opinion that the complainant is entitled to relief, refer said suit to the
commission, as a master in chancery, to ascertain and report an appropriate form of
decree therein. The commission shall proceed upon such notice to the parties and
under such rules of procedure as the court may prescribe, and upon the coming in
of such report such exceptions may be filed and such proceedings had in relation
thereto as upon the report of a master in other equity causes, but the court may
adopt or reject such report, in whole or in part, and enter such decree as the nature
of the case may in its judgment require." 38 STAT. 722 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 47 (1946).
The former alternative, however, would be preferable, since the proceeding might lose
its desired objective flavor if the investigation was conducted by a governmental body.
104. See Timberg, supra note 101.
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why plant X has to be divested; how such a plant can operate
as a functionally independent unit; why such divestiture is necessary
for the dissipation of monopoly power; how such divestiture will in
fact be instrumental in promoting greater competition, etc.
In requesting drastic relief, the Government should point to cases
where such relief was granted and where as a consequence satisfactory
results were achieved. Our experience under the Public Utility Holding
Company Act of 1935,105 for example, might be cited to show how industrial efficiency was increased in many instances through dissolution,
divorcement and divestiture. 10 Similarly, innumerable cases could be
cited where drastic relief was requested and denied and where, as a
result, competition was not restored.
In making its case for a particular relief program, the Government should not rely entirely on the expert testimony of the Antitrust
Division economists. Since the courts might consider such testimony
as being of an ex parte nature, greater reliance should be placed on
expert and disinterested witnesses drawn from industry, government,
and the universities. In this connection, consideration might also be
given to a more frequent use of Section 6(e) of the Federal Trade
Commission Act which authorizes the Commission:
Upon the application of the Attorney General to investigate
and.make recommendations for the readjustment of the business of any corporation alleged to be violating the antitrust
Acts in order that the corporation may thereafter maintain its
organization, management,
and conduct of business in accord10 7
ance with law.
The powers here granted should be used very selectively, however, in
order to minimize the problems connected with effective inter-agency
cooperation; to minimize delay in the settlement of cases; and to conserve
the Commission's energies for comprehensive investigations affecting
the national economy.
During the trial and in the course of relief hearings the Government should impress upon the courts what effective competition means
and what the prerequisites for such competition are. The courts should
be shown that one price in one place at one time is not necessarily the
manifestation of competition; that such price uniformity is often imposed
arbitrarily from outside the market rather than being determined by
105. 49 STAT. 803 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 79 (1946).
106. See Hearings before the Monopoly Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1460-69 (1950).
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the forces of supply and demand within the market. The Government
should impress upon the courts that, in an oligopolistic market structure,
administered prices, price leadership, price uniformity, and price inflexibility are often as valid a proof of monopoly power as the domination
of an industry by a single firm. The distinction between active, vigorous
competition in the economic sense and psychological competition which
consists merely of a gentlemanly sales rivalry between competing producers should be stressed.' 0 8 In short, the Government must emphasize
and re-emphasize that competition from the viewpoint of the individual
businessman does not necessarily meet the standards of competition from
the viewpoint of the economy as a whole. 10 9
If, after having been advised by the Antitrust Division of all the
considerations and relief alternatives, the courts are still reluctant to
undertake the kind of reorganization necessary to accomplish the purpose of the Sherman Act, it might be advisable for Congress to consider
passage of a new antitrust act. By this suggestion, it is not implied
that the relief powers under the Sherman Act are inadequate. We do
believe, however, that judging by past performance, these powers have
not been used to a sufficiently far reaching extent. The new law should
be designed to supplement, not supersede, the Sherman Act. It should
be modeled perhaps along the lines of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, which proved so successful an instrument in the
dissolution of vast utility empires. The new law should clearly set forth
the evils against which antitrust action is to be directed and specify
108. Cf. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
109. The structural characteristics of workable competition in a particular market
may be listed as follows: "1. There must be an appreciable number of sources of
supply and an appreciable number of potential customers for substantially the same
product or service. Suppliers and customers do not need to be so numerous that each
trader is entirely without individual -influence, but their number must be great enough
that persons on the other side of the market may readily turn away from any particular
trader and may find a variety of other alternatives. 2. No trader must be so powerful
as to be able to coerce his rivals, nor so large that the remaining traders lack the
capacity to take over at least a, substantial portion of his trade. 3. Traders must be
responsive to incentives of profit and loss; that is, they must not be so large, so diversified, so devoted to political rather than commercial purposes, so subsidized, or otherwise
so unconcerned with results in a particular market that their policies are not affected
by ordinary commercial incentives arising out of that market. 4. Matters of commercial
policy must be decided by each trader separately without agreement with his rivals.
5. New traders must have opportunity to enter the market without handicap other than
that which is automatically created by the fact that others are already well established
there. 6. Access by traders on one side of the market to those on the other side of the
market must be unimpaired except by obstacles not deliberately introduced, such as
distance or ignorance of the available alternatives. 7. There must be no substantial preferential status within the market for any important trader or group of traders on the
of law, politics, or commercial alliances." EDwARDS, MAINTAINING COMPETITiION"
basis (1949).
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some concrete' and detailed, yet comprehensive, standards for the application of the dissolution, divorcement and divestiture remedy. It should
constitute a clear mandate to the courts that any firm found to possess
monopolistic power be, dissolved into its component parts, unless such
firm can prove its size to be necessary for the maintenance of efficiency. 110 By placing a new "charter of freedom" on the statute books,
congressional intent to promote competition might be more readily
effectuated.
110. For a proposed bill, drafted along these lines, see Hearings, supra note 106,
at 1600-25.

